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seem to have applied in fact in the past without identifying it as a correlative
right to the right of free speech.2
The application of this right may be found in a number of labor cases.
An examination of these cases reveals that the right of free speech of an
employer includes the right to disseminate his views to his employees.2 Simi-
larly, employees may make known to the public the facts of a labor dispute. 4
Employees may also use all lawful propaganda to enlarge membership in their
union. 5 The right to discuss is included in the right to speak.6 The dissemina-
tion of the facts of a labor dispute is within the constitutional guarantee of
liberty to discuss publicly important matters without previous restraint or
fear of punishment.7 The rights of the employer are pot unlimited, as he may
not use the right of free speech to coerce,8 nor to discourage membership in a
union.9 The right to form and express opinion is of little value if communica-
tion to those immediately concerned is made impossible. 10
The application of this principle is not limited to labor cases. A person
has the right to accost another on a public street in an attempt to convert an
unwilling listener, if within the bounds of peace and order.1 ' Shopkeepers in
doorways are within their rights when endeavoring to persuade passers-by to
purchase their wares, although annoying to some;12 and even a stranger has
the right to knock on a door and offer to present his views on religion.18
To have true freedom of speech one must have comprehending listeners.1 4
The foregoing cases have protected the right to reach this audience. The prin-
cipal case further protects the right to be heard in that it allows the speaker
to use mechanical means to reach an even greater audience.
HABEAS CORPUS IN FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS-JURISDICTION
OVER PARTIES
One hundred and twenty Germans, confined at Ellis Island, for deporta-
tion to Germany, filed, in the District Court for the District of Columbia, a
2. See Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105 (1943). (The specific words "right
to be heard" can be found in the dissenting opinion at page 123.)
3. N. L. R. B. v. J. L. Brandeis & Sons, 145 F. 2d 556 (C. C. A. 8th 1944).
4. Schuster v. International Association of Machinists, Auto Mechanics Lodge No.
70, 293 111. App. 177, 12 N. E. 2d 50 (1937).
5. American Steel Foundries v. Tri-City Central Trades Council, 257 U. S. 184
(1921).
6. Thomas v. Collins, Sheriff, 323 U. S, 516 (1945).
7. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U. S. 88 (1940); see SYNopsIs, 2 MIAMI L. Q. 309
(1948).
8. N. L. R. B. v. Glenn L. Martin-Nebraska Co., 141 F. 2d 371 (C. C. A. 8th 1943).
9. N. L. R. B. v. Crown Can Co., 138 F. 2d 263 (C. C. A. 8th 1943).
10. N. L. i, B. v. Ford Motor Co., 114 F. 2d 905 (C. C. A. 6th 1940).
11. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U. S. 296 (1940).
12. McKay Jewellers, In&. v. Bowron. 19 Cal. 2d 595, 122 P. 2d,543 (1942).
13. Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U. S. 141 (1943).
14. OTto, Speech and Freedom of Speech, in FREDOM AND EXPERIENCE 83 (edited
by Hook and Konvitz, 1947).
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus naming the Attorney General of' the
United States as respondent. Held, that both the legal custodian and the pris-
oner must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the court before the writ
can issue. Ahrens v. Clark, 68 Sup. Ct. 1443 (1948).
It is submitted that this ruling is not in harmony with the historic pur-
poses of the writ.1 In the etrly history of the Anglo-Saxons, it was apparently
not uncommon for a person to be spirited away by his persecutors and so con-
cealed that there was little possibility of inquiry into the cause of his im-
prisonment. 2 Thus, the creators of the writ must have contemplated its
application to the situation in which the place of imprisonment was unknown
or in some territory beyond the Dover cliffs, so that if the custodian could be
located, he could be required to produce the body.1
Further, it is proposed that the instant case embodies a departure from
prior interpretations of. those statutes governing the availability of the rem-
edy.4 As a general rule of construction, such statutes, both in England and in
the United States, have been intended to increase the facilities for the obtain-
ment of justice afforded by the writ and not to curtail its efficacy.6
Federal district courts have the power to grant writs of habeas corpus
"within their respective jurisdictions," 6 but there are four possible jurisdic-
tional situations: (1) where both the legal custodian and the prisoner are
within the territorial jurisdiction of the habeas corpus court;7 (2) where
neither is present ;B (3) where the place of confinement is within the jurisdic-
1. The writ of habeas corpus ad subjiciendum is designed to secure the immediate
release of a person whose imprisonment is in violation of the law. Ex porte Bolniian,
4 Cranch 75 (U. S. 1807) ; Ex parte Watkins, 3 Pet.'193 (U. S. 1830) ; Barry v. Hall,
98 F. 2d 222 (App. D. C. 1938) ; Ann. 12 Eng. Rul. Cas. 491 (1916).
2. That such was the practice even after the writ had been established is indicated
"by the arbitrary proceedings of Clarendon, who, in 1667, was accused of sending persons
to 'remote islands, garrisons, and other places, thereby to prevent them from the benefit
of the law ... ' 9 HoLuswoRTr, HISTORY oF ENGLISH LAW 108-125 (3d ed. 1944).
3. The writ is directed to and is served upon the legal custodian, Ex porte Dierks,
55 F. 2d 371 (D. C. Colo. 1932) ; Ex porte Collins, 151 Cal. 340, 90 Pac. 827 (1907),
91 Pac. 397 (1907), aff'd, 214 U. S. 113 (1909); Clark v. Surprenant, 94 F. 2d 969
(C. C. A. 9th 1938) ; Re Boardman, 169 U. S. 39 (1898).
4. In the embryonic stages of the writ, statutes were essential to prevent its ex-
tinction. See The Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 CAR. II., which was designed to remedy,
inter atia, the imprisonment of subjects beyond the seas. 9 HOLoSWORTIn, op. cit. srtpra
note 2.
5. Ex parte Watkins, supra; see also Price v. Johnston, 68 Sup. Ct. 1049 (1948)
(where the court was extremely generous in its application of the remedy).
6. 14 STAT. 385 (1867), as amended, 28 U. S. C. § 452 (1947 Supp.), provides:
"The several justices of the Supreme Court and the several judges of the circuit courts
of appeal and of the district courts, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have
power to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of
restraint of liberty ... "
7. Obviously, in the first instance, there has been no question of jurisdiction as to
parties.
8. At the time the present statute, see note 6 supra, came into the law, the original
bill was thought too broad, so that an amendment was added which included the phrase,
"within their respective jurisdictions." CONG. GLoB, 39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 730, 790
(1867). In the second situation, the lower federal courts have properly refused to issue
the writ, both before and after the passage of this statute: Ex porte Graham, 10 Fed.
Cas. 911, No. 5,657 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 18187 (service of writ bounded by territorial
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tiot, but the custodian is elsewhere ; (4) where the custodian can be served
within the district, but the prisoner is confined either in some other known
jurisdiction or in some place known only to his keeper.
In the last mentioned situation, a number of the lower federal courts
have consistently granted the writ.10 While other district courts have refused
the writ in such an instance, their decisions seem to have been greatly in-
fluenced by the exigencies of war or by an over-zealous desire for adminis-
trative convenience. 12 Although the Supreme Court, during the late war,
limits of district) ; Re Boles, 48 Fed. 75 (C. C. A. 8th 1891) (absence of custodian
appears to have been determining factor) ; Ex parte Gouyet, 175 Fed. 230 (D. C. Mont.
1909) (no power or authority to issue writ out of their respective jurisdictions); EX
parte Yee Hick Ho, 33 F. 2d 360 (N. D. Cal. 1929) (where custodian was master of
vessel at sea) ; United States ex rel. Belardi v. Day, 50 F. 2d 816 (C. C. A. 3d 1931)
(no power to issue writ to be executed outside of territorial jurisdiction) ; Jones v.
Biddle, 131 F. 2d 853 (C. C. A. 8th 1942) (Attorney General of the United States, re-
spondent, outside of jurisdiction-indicated that warden should have been named re-
spondent) ; United States ex rel. Harrington v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F. 2d 935 (C. C. A. 7th
1943) (" . . . writs of habeas corpus issued by the District Court do not run outside
the district.").
In all of the above cases, the courts do not seem to have been troubled with the
absence of the prisoner so much as with the service of process on the absent custodian.
This is extremely significant when the construction given by the instant case to "within
their respective jurisdictions" is considered; see note 18 intra.
9. United States ex rel Corsetti v. Commanding Officer, 3 F. R. D. 360 (E. D. N.
Y. 1944) (where both prisoner and custodian were in the Northern District, the court
decided that Rule 4(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was not applicable and
denied the petition) ; United States ex rel. Goodman v. Roberts, 152 F. 2d 841 (C. C. A.
2d 1946) (service on the corporal of the guard was held not to be effective as to the
commanding officer); see also Jones v. Biddle and Ex parte Yee Hick Ho, supra, as
well as McGowan v. Moody, 22 App. D. C. 148 (1903), and Re Bickley, 3 Fed. Cas.
332, No. 1,387 (S. D. N. Y. 1865) (in regard to difficulty in selecting the proper
respondent).
10. In United States v. Davis, 25 Fed. Cas. 775, No. 14,926 (C. C. D. C. 1839),
although the legal custodian of certain slaves answered that they were removed beyond
the district before service of the writ, he was, nevertheless, required to produce them.
It may be noted that the court suspected that the custodian was attempting to evade
the writ. Query: If absence of the prisoner is fatal to jurisdiction, should the evasion
have been allowed to cure the defect?
A more emphatic decision is Ex parte Fong Yim, 134 Fed. 938 (S. D. N. Y. 1905),
in which Chinese children were detained by the Chinese Exclusion Officer of the state
of New York in the Northern District. The court determined that although the officer
was not the actual custodian, the custodian being "the person who keeps them confined
in the building... " since the officer had admitted that he was detaining the children
and had waived their production, the cause might proceed as though they had in fact
been produced. Query: If it is to be assumed that there was no jurisdiction due to the
absence of the children, was the court correct in allowing waiver of this lack of juris-
diction?
See also Ex parte Ng Quong Ming, 135 Fed. 378 (S. D. N. Y. 1905) (similar
waiver of production). Note that in the instant case, waiver of production was not
allowed, seo infra note 20.
I1. Re Bickley, supra. "There is a manifest incongruity, at a time of flagrant war,
for a civil tribunal to issue a mandate to a Major-General . . . coercing him to leave
his immediate post . . . and depart to a different and remote one, and return from
thence a prisoner ... "
12. This is certainly true of the District Court for the District of Columbia, wherein
reside innumerable federal officials, e.g., the Attorney General of the United States. "An
interpretation which would permit resort to the courts in the District of Columbia for
writs of habeas corpus by prisoners in federal institutions all over the United States is
without justification either in convenience or logic... " Sanders v. Bennett, 148 F. 2d
19 (App. D. C. 1945) ; Ex pate Flick, 76 F. Supp. 979 (D. D. C. 1948) (- . . a writ
of habeas corpus may be issued only in respect to a person . . . restrained of hi lerty
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affirmed, in an emphatic manner, the theory of those cases in which the writ
was granted,' 3 in the instant case, it ignored the previously approved reason-
ing 4 and overruled those lower federal court decisions.'5
Mr. Justice Rutledge, in dissenting, emphasized that the majority, felt
itself confronted with two alternatives: (1) that no jurisdiction existed, or
(2) "that petitioners have a right to be heard in a distant court whenever the
Attorney General may there be served." 16 While the majority chose the first
alternative, it was further explained in the dissenting opinion that the second
could have been avoided by holding that while the district court had jurisdic-
tion, it could, in its discretion, decline its exercise. 17 Since the Supreme Court
has not always been awed by distance' and since, in future decisions, this
within the territorial jurisdiction. ) McGowan v. Moody, supra (question is one
of power, and not of expediency).
Despite this assertion that the question is one of "power," in other cases (See
dissent in instant case, p. 1392, n. 24, for description of peculiar circumstances under-
lying these cases) where it was found that administrative "expediency" would best be
served by exercising jurisdiction, that court has not been troubled by the absence of
the prisoner.
Sanders v. Allen, 100 F. 2d 717 (App. D. C. 1939), granting the writ, the court
said, "The question . . . depends rather upon whether the person against whom the
writ is asked and who is responsible for the detention is 'within the jurisdiction," and
being compelled to distinguish the McGowan case. supra, stated, "In such situations,
even if the courts of the District of Columbia had jurisdiction, they should not exercise..
it where the same relief is available by application to a district or circuit judge in the
locality." See also Burns v. Welch, 159 F. 2d 29 (App. D. C. 1947).
13. Ex porte Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944) (The petitioner was, at the time suit
was instituted, within the jurisdiction of the habeas corpus court but was. subsequently
removed, United States v. Davis, supra), the court said emphatically: "There are ex-
pressions in some of the cases which indicate that the place of confinement must be within
the court's territorial jurisdiction in order to enable it to issue the writ. But we are of
the view that the court may act if there is a respondent within reach of its process who
has custody of the petitioner."
14. Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting, in the instant case,' reminded the majority of
the reasoning of Judge Cooley in Re Jackson, 15 Mich. 416, 439-440 (1867), which
the Court had quoted in Ex parte Endo, supra, as follows: ". . . this writ is . . . directed
to, and served upon, not the person confined, but his jailer .... The whole force of the
writ is spent upon the respondent . The dissent also noted the further language
of Judge Cooley: "The place of confinement is therefore not important to the relief.
if the guilty party is within reach of process ... "
15. Cases cited note 10 supro. The majority in the instant case apparently failed to
distinguish between those cases where both custodian and prisoner are outside the
territorial jurisdiction; see note 8 supra, and those cases where the custodian is present
though the prisoner is elsewhere; see note 10 suipro.
16. This would seem to be a reverberation of the fears often expressed by the
District Court for the District of Columbia. Cases cited note 12 supra.
17. Although the District Court for the District of Columbia would vigorously deny
it (See language in McGowan v. Moody, supra), the decisions of that court appear to
be reconcilable only on the basis of the existence of discretion. See note 12 supra.
18. When a prisoner confined in Alcatraz sought to come before the Court in order
to personally argue his petition, the Court ignored the remote location of the prison.
Price v. Johnston, 68 Sup. Ct. 1049 (1948).
In the instant case, the majority, in construing the amendment of 1867, see note 6
supra, was in some measure influenced by the aspect of distance; and it determined that
the amendment had been introduced in order to prevent the production of prisoners from
remote districts. Mr. Justice Rutledge, in dissent, argued that the amendment was de-
signed to apply to service of process and not to the location of the prisoner. CoNG. GLOB.,
39th Cong., 2nd Sess. 790 (1867).
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ruling may impose tragic injustice, 19 the escape route indicated might have
afforded the greatest convenience and maximum safety.
The Court did not determine whether or not the Attorney General was
the proper respondent. 20 Nevertheless, it may well be that the conclusion
reached was based in part on a conviction that the petitioners might have
avoided the jurisdictional question by seeking the writ in a New York federal
court and naming as respondent some agent of the Attorney General who
could be served therein.2' Thus, the Court may have reasoned that issuance
of the writ in this instance would have amounted to an unwarranted inter-
ference with a co-ordinate branch of the government. 22
The consequences of the holding, it is submitted, portend almost omi-
nous aspects. What is now to be the result in those instances:
(1) "Where the place of imprisonment, whether by private or public
action, is unknown."
(2) "Where the place of imprisonment is in the district of the habeas
corpus court, but the jailer is present in and can be served with process only
in another."
(3) Where the "place of detention lies wholly outside the territorial
limits of any federal jurisdiction, although the person or persons exercising
restraint are clearly within reach of such authority....2
These consequences may assume tragic proportions in these crucial days
when great numbers of men are being called to the armed services pursuant
to a law which contains innumerable classifications ;24 when the danger of
subversive elements in our midst is so great that protective measures must
19. See Ex parle Flick and McGowan v. Moody, supra, as well as Fiedler v. Shuttle-
worth, 57 F. Supp. 591 (W. D. Pa. 1944).
20. The Court stated that, since there was a defect in jurisdiction, it did "not reach
the question whether the Attorney General is the proper respondent . . . and, if not,
whether the objection may be waived, as respondent is willing to do. .. " Ahrens v.
Clark, 68 Sup. Ct. 1443, 1445-6 (1948). Cf. Ex porte Ng Quong Ming and Ex parte
Fong Yim supra (where waiver of production of the prisoner was permitted).
21. It would appear that this question could have been avoided in numerous cases
had the petitioners chosen lesser officials as respondents. See 5ones v. Biddle, supra, and
McGowan v. Moody, siopra.
22. In this respect the Court could have drawn analogies from similar cases in-
volving other extraordinary writs. State of Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. 475 (U. S.
1867) (where injunction was sought to restrain President Johnson from carrying the
R.coxsTatucTIoN Acrs into effect); Blalock v. Johnston, 180 S. C. 40, 185 S. E. 51
(1936) (mandamus) ; Fergus v. Blackwell, 342 Ill. 223, 173 N. E. 750 (1930) (quo
warranto).
23. This is the only one of the possible consequences of the decision which the
majority chose to mention, saying, "We need not determine the question of what process,
if any, a person confined in an area not subject to the jurisdiction of any district court
may employ to assert Federal rights. .. ."
Other exceptions were considered in the AfcGourn decision; see note 9 supra. "For
example, if in anticipation of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, the petitioner
should be forcibly removed from the jurisdiction . .. it may well he that the Court
could still entertain the petition .. "
24. The incident which occurred in United States ex reL Goodman v. Roberts,
supra, may be all too common under the SELECTIVE SERVicE AcT, Pub. L. No. 759, 80th
Cong., 2nd Sess., § 6 (June 24, 1948).
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necessarily curtail constitutional liberties;25 and when "mass evacuation of
groups from a given area" 26 may be deemed necessary in time of national
emergency.
MILITARY LAW-RE-ENLISTMENT AS REVIVING NAVY COURT-MARTIAL
JURISDICTION OVER OFFENSES COMMITTED
DURING PREVIOUS SERVICE
After the relator had been honorably discharged from the Navy and had
re-enlisted, he was tried and convicted by a general court-martial for offenses
alleged to have been committed during his earlier enlistment. Held, reversing
the order of the district court sustaining a writ of habeas corpus, that since
an administrative interpretation is only evidence of the meaning of a statute,
a later interpretation may take precedence and allow the court-martial to ex-
ercise jurisdiction. United States ex rel. Hirshberg v. Malanaphy, 168 F. 2d
503 (C. C. A. 2d 1948).
For seventy years the Navy had interpreted the court-martial statute
to mean that, except for offenses involving fraud,2 a member of the Navy who
had received an honorable discharge and re-enlisted, no matter how soon
afterward, could not be tried by court-martial for offenses committed during
his prior enlistment.3 But in 1932 the Navy adopted an opposite inter-
pretation, which was incorporated into Article 334, NAVAL COURTS AND
BOARDS, 1937.4 It is required that such instructions issued by the Executive
shall be recognized as the regulations of the Navy,3 and as such they have
the force of law.6 That this provision7 "was only intended to recognize
the power of the President to alter regulations which he was originally
25. In this respect, Mr. Justice Rutledge, in the instant case, calls attention to
Duncan v. Kohanamoku, 327 U. S. 304 (1946), and E.r parte Milligan, 4 Wall. 2 (U. S.
1866). See also Kiyoshi Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943).
26. As to this possibility, Mr. Justice Rutledge, dissenting in the instant case. cited
Hirabayashi v. United States, supra. See also Toyosaburo Korematsu v. United States,
323 U. S. 214 (1944).
I. Articles for the Government of the Navy, 12 STAT. 600 (1862), 34 U. S. C. § 1200
(1946).
2. Ibid., Article 14, which corresponds to Article 94 of the Articles of War, 41
STAT. 805 (1920), 10 U. S. C. § 1566 (1946). The latter was held to be unconstitutional
in United States ex rel Flannery v. Commanding General, 69 F. Supp. 661 (S. D. N. Y.
1946).
3. WINTHROP, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS 93 (1920 ed.) ; CMO 22-1917, page
7; CMO 12-1921, page 11; CMO 1-1926, page 9; CMO 12-1929, page 7.
4. Issued by the Secretary of the Navy, March 4, 1937, and approved by the Presi-
dent, March 5, 1937. It reads, inter alia: ". . . if an officer reoiters service ... he may
be tried by court-martial for an offense committed during his previous service, whether
or not the offense is one for which trial by court martial after separation from the service
is specifically authorized by statute. . . . Similarly . . . an enlisted man ......
5. 12 STAT. 565 (1862), 34 U. S. C. § 591 (1946).
6. See Denby v. Berry, 263 U. S. 29, 37 (1923), in which the Court relied on what
is now 34 U. S. C. § 591.
7. See note 5 supra.
